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2
Job Displacements in Recessions
An Overview of Long-Term 
Consequences and Policy Options
Till von Wachter
University of California–Los Angeles 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Institute for the Study of Labor
As the U.S. economy continues to recover from the Great Recession, 
an important unknown is the fate of the millions of workers affected by 
layoffs and lengthening spells of unemployment. This chapter focuses 
on the short- and long-term consequences of layoffs and unemploy-
ment for affected workers, and on potential policy options to ease the 
burden of adjustment on workers and their families. 
Judging from experience in past recessions, the consequences of 
layoffs for job losers are severe and persistent across several dimen-
sions. The average mature worker losing a stable job with a good 
employer will see earnings reductions of 20 percent lasting over 15–20 
years. While these earnings losses vary somewhat among demographic 
groups or industries, no group in the labor market is exempt from sig-
nifi cant and long-lasting costs of job loss (von Wachter, Song, and 
Manchester 2011a). 
A job loss is also typically followed by an extended period of insta-
bility of employment and earnings. During this period, job losers can 
experience declines in health. In severe downturns, these health declines 
can lead to a signifi cant reduction in life expectancy of 1–1.5 years 
(Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). The consequences of job loss are also 
felt by workers’ children—who can suffer even into adulthood—and 
their families. All of these costs are likely to be greater for the long-term 
unemployed.
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Government programs can alleviate part of the short-term earnings 
loss associated with job loss and unemployment. As a typical measure, 
extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) 
• ease the burden of adjustment for laid-off workers, 
• are likely to prevent entry into more costly government programs 
such as disability insurance, 
• provide a degree of demand stabilization, and 
• are unlikely—at least in recessions—to be associated with sig-
nifi cant reductions in employment in the short or the long run. 
However, policy is unlikely to be able to prevent the large and last-
ing reductions in earnings that eventually follow a typical job loss. 
The majority of long-term losses are due to factors that are not eas-
ily manipulated by government policy, such as losses in the value of 
certain skills as industries decline, the loss of long-term career jobs, or 
slow wage-adjustment in the labor market. Some policies, though, have 
been shown to be able to reduce unemployment, such as targeted efforts 
to help workers in their job search, or programs reducing the costs of 
long-term adjustment, such as the costs of retraining.
Given the diffi culties of helping job losers and unemployed workers 
recover from long-term earnings losses after the fact, it may be worth-
while to explore available options to prevent large-scale layoffs in the 
future. Such options include programs of work sharing to subsidize 
employment before workers are laid off and become unemployed, to 
encourage the introduction of fl exible work-time arrangements, or to 
encourage the provision of credit to economically viable fi rms affected 
by distress in fi nancial markets. 
For example, the cost of UI benefi ts for a typical worker is a small 
fraction of the total earnings lost due to a layoff over the remainder 
of the individual’s working life. If the same benefi ts were paid during 
employment to avoid job loss, the cost of recessions would be substan-
tially reduced. This would be benefi cial even if the worker were to be 
let go eventually, since earnings losses tend to be signifi cantly smaller 
for layoffs that do not occur in a large recession.
Overall, job loss and unemployment during severe recessions can 
impose substantial and lasting costs on affected workers in terms of 
earnings, health, and strain on their families. The short-term burden 
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of these costs can in part be alleviated at a comparatively small cost, 
such as by extensions in UI. Less is known about how to help reduce 
the substantial long-term costs. While cost-effective policies may be 
available to help reemploy the long-term unemployed, the potential of 
policy interventions to signifi cantly aid recovery of long-term earnings 
declines appears bleaker. Given these large and long-term costs, pre-
ventive measures to avoid massive layoffs are a policy option worth 
considering.
THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF 
LAYOFF AND UNEMPLOYMENT
An increasing literature has documented that job losses during 
recessions have severe and lasting consequences for earnings. For 
example, workers displaced in the recession of the early 1980s—which, 
until 2008, was the strongest U.S. recession since World War II—on 
average had earnings reductions of 30 percent or more in the fi rst year 
after layoff. These losses declined somewhat over time, but even 15–20 
years after job loss, the earnings reduction was still 20 percent (Jacob-
son, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 
2011a). Such lasting earnings reductions occurred for job losers in all 
age ranges, in all industries, for men and women, and throughout the 
earnings distribution. This phenomenon is not limited to the early 1980s 
recession or to particular regions of the country, and it does not depend 
on the particular way of measuring the cost of displacement.1 Older 
workers suffer larger losses in earnings, but these losses extend over 
shorter periods of time, since remaining lives are shorter and job loss 
hastens retirement (Chan and Stevens 2001). Workers in the middle of 
the education distribution, such as workers with some college or only 
a high school degree, appear to lose more than very low- or very high-
skilled individuals (von Wachter and Handwerker 2009).
These long-lasting reductions in earnings occur alongside, and may 
be partly augmented by, increases in job instability, recurring transitions 
to nonemployment, and repeated switches of industry or occupation 
(Stevens 1997; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). Some of 
this increased mobility between jobs may be a sign of benefi cial adjust-
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ment, but on average those workers who immediately fi nd a stable job 
in their predisplacement industry do signifi cantly better. The increase in 
job instability lasts up to 10 years after layoff. During the same period, 
these workers experience continuing increases in earnings instability. 
Thus, there is no sign that laid-off workers trade lower earnings for 
more stable employment. While heightened regional mobility appears 
benefi cial in the short run, as mobile workers may eschew a particularly 
depressed local labor market, movers do not have lower long-term earn-
ings losses.
There is also increasing evidence that laid-off workers suffer short- 
and long-term declines in health. In the short term, layoffs and unem-
ployment are associated with an increasing incidence of stress-related 
health problems, such as strokes or heart attacks (Burgard, Brand, and 
House 2007). These problems can lead to a large spike in mortality 
right after job loss. For example, mature men who lost their stable jobs 
in Pennsylvania during the early 1980s experienced an increase in the 
mortality rate right after job loss of up to 100 percent. This initial rise in 
mortality declines over time, but mortality remains signifi cantly higher 
for job losers than for comparable workers who did not lose their jobs. 
If sustained until the end of their lives, such increases lead to reductions 
in life expectancy of 1–1.5 years (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009).
Several studies also point to short- and long-term effects of layoffs 
on the children and families of job losers and unemployed workers. For 
example, in the short run, parental job loss reduces schooling achieve-
ment of children (Stevens and Schaller 2009). In the long run, it appears 
that a lasting reduction in the earnings of fathers also reduces the earn-
ings prospects of their sons (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2008). 
There is also evidence that layoff heightens the incidence of divorce, 
reduces home ownership, and increases the rate of application to and 
the receipt of disability insurance programs (Charles and Stephens 
2004; Rege, Telle, and Votruba 2009; Rupp and Stapleton 1995; von 
Wachter and Handwerker 2009).
All of these costs are likely to be larger for workers who are unem-
ployed for longer periods of time. It is well documented that earnings 
losses for unemployed workers increase signifi cantly with time spent 
outside employment (Congressional Budget Offi ce 2007; Machin and 
Manning 1999). It is diffi cult to establish whether this is because the 
duration itself worsens labor market prospects, or because those workers 
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facing the strongest challenges in the labor market take longer to fi nd a 
new job. In one of a few studies establishing causality, Schmieder, von 
Wachter, and Bender (2012b) show that nonemployment indeed leads 
to lower reemployment wages, at least in Germany. Independently of 
the source, longer unemployment spells are likely to put a signifi cant 
additional strain on workers’ fi nancial situations and the overall well-
being of both themselves and their families. These workers are also 
particularly dependent on benefi ts from UI. The poverty rate among the 
long-term unemployed is high, especially for those exhausting unem-
ployment benefi ts (Congressional Budget Offi ce 2008, Tables 6 and 9).
Finally, even though they were not laid off or are not offi cially 
counted as unemployed, the long-term earnings and career prospects of 
young workers entering the labor market during a recession also suffer. 
For example, individuals graduating from college during a large reces-
sion are likely to see reduced earnings for 10–15 years compared to 
more fortunate graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and 
Heisz 2012; Oyer 2008). As is the case for job losers, those labor mar-
ket entrants in the middle of the education distribution do worse, while 
those with lower or higher education tend to do better (Kondo 2008; 
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). The pattern of recovery of 
unlucky college graduates is telling: a recession reduces the quality 
of the fi rst employer. After about fi ve years, workers fi nd an employer 
of better quality, but their earnings still have to recover within the fi rm 
relative to more fortunate graduates who obtained their jobs in better 
economic times. Thus, the initial setback in the career can take 10–15 
years to dissipate, even for this very mobile demographic group.
THE REASONS FOR LONG-TERM EARNINGS LOSSES 
AFTER LAYOFF AND UNEMPLOYMENT
There are several potential sources of lasting reductions in earnings 
after a layoff. An often cited explanation attributes the losses in earnings 
to a loss in the use of certain skills, as some industries or occupations 
shift their operations elsewhere or permanently reduce their employ-
ment levels. If some of workers’ earnings derived from payment for ser-
vices and skills only needed in specifi c industries or occupations, upon 
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job loss workers lose wages associated with these skills (Neal 1995; 
Parent 2000; Poletaev and Robinson 2008). Such a loss can lead to 
long-term earnings declines if workers do not reinvest in a new equiva-
lent set of skills. Particularly for middle-aged or older workers, it might 
not be worth spending their time and money in costly retraining as they 
face uncertain reemployment over a shorter remaining working life. 
Another explanation is that workers in stable jobs, especially work-
ers aged 30 or older, are likely to have found an occupation and an 
employer suitable for their interests and qualifi cations. The process of 
searching for such a job can take time, involving both changes of occu-
pations and employers in the beginning of their careers, as well as job 
search and promotions within a fi rm (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
1994; Neal 1999; Topel and Ward 1992). On average, this phase of 
workers’ careers can last 10 years. Part of the gain from this prolonged 
search and matching process is lost at job loss. By its nature, fi nding 
such a suitable job again is likely to take a long time. If job offers start 
arriving only as the economy picks up, the adjustment process can last 
well beyond recovery in the aggregate labor market. 
Increasing evidence also suggests that the fi rst wage on a worker’s 
new job is likely to infl uence her pay for a long time (Beaudry and 
DiNardo 1991; Schmieder and von Wachter 2010). This persistence 
can arise from (explicit or implicit) wage contracts between workers 
and fi rms. Since many unemployed workers end up fi nding the fi rst job 
when wages are still depressed due to the recession, persistence implies 
that they may live with lower earnings for quite some time. As a result, 
workers laid off in recessions suffer substantially larger earnings losses 
than workers laid off in booms (Davis and von Wachter 2012). Although 
workers can improve their pay by obtaining outside job offers, chang-
ing jobs, or relocating, many face obstacles to such adjustment, often 
due to family commitments. However, the rate of mobility is likely to 
be too low even given those factors, possibly because individuals do not 
realize the need to keep improving their economic situations 5–10 years 
after a job loss or an unemployment spell. 
Some workers may also experience reductions in earnings because 
they held jobs in industries or at fi rms that paid exceptionally high 
wages. Yet, it does not appear that workers in such jobs are more likely 
to be laid off. In fact, during large recessions job losers are less likely to 
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be selected from high-wage jobs, partly because economic diffi culties 
are widespread and do not just affect single fi rms or sectors. Similarly, 
it is unlikely that job losses arise because fi rms systematically let go 
those workers who are overpaid or who are least productive.2
POLICY OPTIONS TO EASE THE BURDEN OF ADJUSTMENT 
OF LAID-OFF AND UNEMPLOYED WORKERS
Policies Aimed at Reducing the Burden of Short-Term 
Earnings Losses
Government programs can help to ease the burden of the short-term 
cost of job loss and unemployment. The most common approach to do 
so has been to increase the duration over which eligible workers can 
receive unemployment benefi ts. In the 2008 recession, the maximum 
duration of UI benefi ts was 99 weeks, about four times the regular dura-
tion of 26 weeks. Signifi cant extensions in the duration of UI also took 
place in the 1982 and 1990 recessions (Congressional Budget Offi ce 
2004). 
Extensions of UI benefi ts have several benefi cial aspects for recipi-
ents and for the economy as a whole. Extended benefi ts allow workers 
to buffer the effect of the earnings loss on consumption, albeit con-
sumption still falls for the average UI recipient (Browning and Cross-
ley 2001; Congressional Budget Offi ce 2007; Gruber 1997). In addi-
tion, extended benefi ts allow workers to search longer for a suitable 
job, and provide insurance against the stress of not being able to fi nd 
a job because of continued slack in the labor market. Extensions in UI 
benefi ts also prevent some workers from applying to other government 
programs not intended to smooth short-term economic shocks, such as 
Social Security Disability Insurance or Old Age and Survivors Insur-
ance. In particular, benefi ts provided under disability insurance can be 
very costly, especially if provided to younger or middle-aged workers 
with low-mortality impairment (Autor and Duggan 2006; von Wachter, 
Song, and Manchester 2011b). While increases in unemployment rates 
typically lead to a signifi cant rise in application and award rates, exten-
sions in UI have the potential to dampen this effect. Finally, extended 
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UI benefi ts can provide a degree of demand stabilization through the 
multiplier effect (Congressional Budget Offi ce 2008, Table 1).
On the downside, several studies have suggested that UI may impose 
a cost by reducing recipients’ willingness to work (Congressional Bud-
get Offi ce 2008).3 In addition, prolonged spells of unemployment may 
lead workers’ skills to atrophy or otherwise reduce their employabil-
ity. Yet, it is likely that in severe recessions the benefi t of extended UI 
outweighs the costs. First, the value of income replacement to workers 
should be particularly high. Second, longer UI durations are unlikely to 
have a strong effect on employment, since strategic considerations are 
likely to be weaker when the number of jobs is scarce (see, for example, 
Congressional Budget Offi ce [2008]). Moreover, recent research sug-
gests that a sizable part of the decline in employment may not be due to 
the reduction in the willingness of UI recipients to work, but rather to 
the fact that some individuals have limited access to credit. If this is the 
case, not all of the employment effects of UI represent a distortion, but 
it may be a sign that UI helps to alleviate credit constraints that prevent 
individuals from self-insuring against unemployment shocks.4
In the only study of its kind, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 
(2012a) analyze large extensions in the durations of UI in Germany and 
show that these led to only moderate reductions in employment, without 
a noticeable difference in this effect in large recessions. Based on a very 
large sample of unemployed workers spanning over 25 years and utiliz-
ing a very credible research design, these fi ndings lie at the lower range 
of typical U.S. estimates (Meyer 2002, Table 5). For a large increase in 
UI duration from 26 to 99 weeks, the estimates from Germany suggest 
that extended UI would lead to a moderate increase in the rate of unem-
ployment. Yet, for several reasons the current effect in the United States 
would likely be smaller. The increases in UI durations were stepwise, 
and extension was not always certain. Only 50 percent of all eligible 
unemployed workers have taken up UI benefi ts in this recession, further 
reducing the potential impact of UI extensions on employment.5 Finally, 
the effects on aggregate employment are based on the assumption of full 
employment; under a slack labor market, the effect of individual search 
decisions on aggregate employment is likely to be smaller.6
This research also suggests that contrary to what is often believed, 
extensions in UI benefi ts appear to neither help nor strongly hurt the 
longer-term job prospects of recipients. Increases in UI durations have 
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small negative effects on the wage at the fi rst job after unemployment. 
Yet, neither the wage nor the employment rate fi ve years after entry 
into unemployment is affected by longer UI durations (Schmieder, von 
Wachter, and Bender 2012b). Thus, it appears that extended UI benefi ts 
have an effect on workers’ disposable income, consumption, and short-
term employment choice, but they may have neither strong adverse nor 
benefi cial effects on long-term employment prospects.
Several other measures to ease the short-term burden of adjustment 
have been tried in the current and in past downturns, and have been 
featured in policy proposals in the 2008 recession. These include wage 
subsidies paid to employers and tax breaks for fi rms to raise job cre-
ation, temporary assistance to obtain further training, and some form 
of public employment. The best available evidence suggests that these 
measures are somewhat successful in reducing unemployment and 
alleviating earnings losses of job losers.7 These measures do not share 
the advantage of extended UI, which builds on an existing infrastruc-
ture of a successfully functioning program and immediately affects UI 
recipients and the economy (Congressional Budget Offi ce 2008, Table 
1). However, with the exception of training, the measures share with 
extended UI the mainly short-term focus, with less known long-term 
benefi ts for laid-off and unemployed workers.
Policies Aimed at Reducing Long-Term Unemployment and 
Lasting Earnings Losses 
The reach of the large losses in earnings, increases in job instabil-
ity, and reductions in health goes beyond the duration of extended UI 
benefi ts. In fact, since the losses persist well beyond 5 or 10 years, the 
majority of the lifetime loss in earnings occurs after eligibility for UI 
benefi ts has expired. Yet, few policy options are available to alleviate 
the long-run costs of job loss and unemployment.
For example, there is no current evidence that the longer duration 
of UI benefi ts improves the long-term earnings or employment trajecto-
ries of the unemployed (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 2012b). 
Similarly, the evidence of efforts to successfully train laid-off work-
ers in new skills is mixed, and there is little evidence available on the 
long-term effects of other programs.8 By the nature of the mechanisms 
behind long-term earnings losses as explained above, it is unlikely that 
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any policy will completely close or signifi cantly reduce the long-term 
earnings gap—short of altering the market’s mechanisms of wage set-
ting, the trade-offs governing workers’ investment in their skills, or the 
multiple factors affecting the decision to relocate. Yet, there are some 
options available to help those with long unemployment spells fi nd jobs 
and try to improve the long-term earnings prospects of job losers.
In particular, it is likely that a lack in mobility between jobs, occu-
pations, or regions will contribute to the persistence of reductions in 
earnings at job loss, perhaps because workers are not aware of the time 
it would take to dissipate their earnings losses. As explained above, the 
individual’s recovery process is likely to last well beyond the recov-
ery of the aggregate labor market. Job losers might not be aware of 
the long-term efforts required to rebuild a career, and active counseling 
may help in bringing expectations in line with the reality workers will 
be facing in the labor market. Evaluations of job search assistance have 
found that counseling reduces UI rolls and is cost-effective.9
Another reason why workers do not move or change occupations 
might be because they are not aware that the job prospects in their lines 
of work and in their local labor markets may have declined perma-
nently. This may lead individuals to wrongly assess the prospects of 
fi nding a job in their old industries or occupations in their local labor 
markets, and wait too long to switch careers, change employers, or 
move to another region. Information on how job prospects in the work-
ers’ professions and related occupations are evolving both locally and 
nationally might be a useful tool to help unemployed workers and their 
families make better choices. Such information is routinely available 
from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and could, 
for example, be included with workers’ UI benefi t checks.
Part of the effort to rebuild a career might involve retraining or relo-
cating. One way to raise mobility is to offer workers support in cover-
ing expenses related to retraining or moving. Evaluations of subsidies 
to attend community college have found that they, on average, raise 
earnings of displaced workers, particularly if covered subjects are of a 
more technical nature. However, such programs seem to be benefi cial 
and cost-effective for selected populations but may not be a solution for 
the broader population of participants (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 
2005). Less is known about the potential benefi ts of relocating unem-
ployed workers. On the one hand, reallocation of labor across regions 
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plays an important role in equilibrating local labor markets (Blanchard 
and Katz 1992). On the other hand, regional mobility does not appear 
to signifi cantly lower earnings losses of displaced workers, perhaps 
because most large recessions affl ict most regions of the country (von 
Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). Yet, over the longer run, gov-
ernment programs helping unemployed workers to relocate, for exam-
ple, by reducing their mortgage debt, are likely to help workers recover 
some of their lost earnings.
An alternative set of policies includes efforts to directly stimu-
late employment growth at the local level. These could be targeted at 
improving the economic situation in regions particularly hard hit by 
the recent downturn. Yet, in general, an upturn in the labor market 
improves the lot of some workers, but does not raise the earnings tra-
jectory of job losers or those formerly unemployed (Jacobson, Lalonde, 
and Sullivan 1993; von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2011a). There 
is no reason per se why localized policies should have a different effect 
on the employment of the long-term unemployed or the earnings of 
reemployed laid-off workers than a regular upturn in the labor market. 
One reason why workers experiencing long-term unemployment 
spells are not affected by an improvement in labor market conditions 
is that they have become detached from the labor market. In this case, 
low-cost policies, such as informing workers about job opportunities 
or the employment outlook in their occupation, may not deliver the 
desired effect of increasing workers’ mobility and raising their chances 
of fi nding a job. In this case, a more active approach may be needed 
to reintegrate long-term unemployed workers into the labor market. 
For example, it may be cost-effi cient to temporarily subsidize workers’ 
wages upon reemployment for a certain period if this leads to a perma-
nent increase in labor force participation and reduces applications to 
programs geared for the disabled or the poor.10
Finally, given increasing evidence that children’s long-term eco-
nomic success might be infl uenced by the layoff of a parent, it is worth 
considering ways to directly assist families with children. One possibil-
ity that builds on existing programs is to provide additional fi nancial aid 
to cover college tuition and living expenses. While work on the cross-
generational effects of displacement is still developing, many families 
that experienced a layoff with children in college or nearing college 
age today are likely to feel the pinch in their fi nancial resources. Thus, 
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it may be worth exploring measures to help cover part of the costs of 
higher education or training for the children of job losers.
Policy Initiatives to Avoid Mass Layoffs in Future Recessions
It is likely that cost-effective government policies can help the long-
term unemployed fi nd renewed employment. Yet, few measures prom-
ise to substantially reduce the long-term earnings losses that can affl ict 
laid-off or unemployed workers. While Congress considers fi nancial 
reform to safeguard against another fi nancial crisis, it may be worth 
considering reforms that help prevent costly earnings losses during a 
future recession, such as work sharing. For jobs lost in declining fi rms 
or industries, this may mean that inevitable job destruction would be 
spread over time. Thus, layoffs would likely occur in a better economic 
environment and therefore lead to signifi cantly smaller losses in earn-
ings. For jobs lost in economically viable sectors or at viable fi rms, 
work sharing could avoid costly breakup of productive employment 
relationships that would have likely continued in the absence of an eco-
nomic crisis.
Two mechanisms to achieve such a temporary buffering of employ-
ment at fi rms in economic diffi culties could be work-sharing arrange-
ments supported by the government, or private arrangements such as 
work-time accounts. Work sharing has effects that are similar to those 
of current measures to increase job creation through tax breaks or wage 
subsidies, except that incentives to generate employment are given 
prior to job displacement. In particular, instead of fi ring, say, 30 per-
cent of its workers, an employer would reduce hours worked by all 
of its workers by 30 percent. Government subsidies comprise part of 
workers’ reduced earnings. They could be fi nanced partially by the UI 
system, in which case workers essentially draw part of the benefi ts they 
would have received if they had become unemployed.
Work-sharing policies have been currently adopted by 21 U.S. 
states. Yet, these have a limited public commitment to replace earnings, 
so the take-up is relatively low. Even though a large amount of layoffs 
have already taken place, if expanded, such programs could increase 
aggregate employment by reducing continuing layoffs at those fi rms 
that keep shedding workers.11 Work sharing was also available to fi rms 
in Germany during the current recession, and has been credited to have 
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helped avert a signifi cant number of layoffs, despite a drop in GDP 
growth that was larger than the decline in the United States.12 Clearly, it 
is important to pay attention to the details of such an arrangement. From 
the point of view of UI, being unemployed is a clearly defi ned state. For 
administering work sharing, it may be diffi cult to screen eligible fi rms. 
Yet, the successful implementation by many states suggests that these 
diffi culties can be surmounted on a practical level. 
The evaluation of work sharing is still at an early stage. However, it 
comes with lower fi nancial involvement and less direct steering of eco-
nomic activities than more targeted interventions, and is likely to extend 
the benefi ts of government support to a much broader group of workers. 
A related strategy to help avert layoffs of productive workers would 
be to create programs geared to maintain access to short-term credit to 
fi rms in fi nancial distress that are otherwise economically viable. This 
approach would be most sensible in times of a sudden reduction in pri-
vate credit, such as what occurred after the fi nancial crisis in 2008.
A second approach would be to encourage workers and fi rms to 
fi nd private solutions to reduce the risk of layoffs, such as work-time 
accounts based on an agreement between workers and fi rms to smooth 
hours over the business cycle. Thus, effectively the fi rm saves part of 
the overtime pay on behalf of workers during good economic times, 
and draws down balances when economic conditions worsen instead of 
fi ring the worker. In addition to work sharing, such work-time accounts 
were a major factor in keeping layoffs to a minimum in Germany dur-
ing the current recession. The use of these accounts was particularly 
prevalent in sectors that exhibited stable growth prior to the crisis and 
were experiencing shortages in skilled labor (Möller 2010). Such an 
arrangement is based on long-term relationships between workers and 
fi rms that involve some degree of fi rm- or sector-specifi c skills. While 
the paradigm in the United States is one of high labor turnover, many 
employment relationships are long-lasting, and employers invest in 
searching for and training workers. Thus, in light of the large costs of 
job displacement, such arrangements may be benefi cial to both workers 
and fi rms.13
Clearly, layoffs cannot be prevented altogether and are to some 
extent a natural feature of a market economy. However, in special cir-
cumstances, such as the fi nancial crisis of 2008 or high interest rates 
in 1982, some layoffs might occur at otherwise healthy fi rms, leading 
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to costly layoffs as productive employment relationships are severed. 
Similarly, layoffs in declining industries might be accelerated, leading 
to large-scale layoffs that exceed the capacity of the labor market to 
reallocate these workers. For such cases, mechanisms that allow fi rms 
to avoid large-scale layoffs could prevent large and lasting conse-
quences affecting a high number of workers. The potential benefi t of 
such safeguards is underscored by the diffi culty of alleviating the long-
term consequences of workers affected by layoffs and unemployment.
CONCLUSION 
An increasing number of studies indicate that job loss and unem-
ployment during recessions can impose large and lasting costs on 
affected workers and their families. The short-term burden of these 
costs can be alleviated relatively cost-effectively, such as by extending 
UI. Less is known about how to help workers adjust to the signifi cant 
long-term costs. While cost-effective policies exist to reintegrate the 
long-term unemployed into the labor market, the potential for policy 
interventions to reduce long-term earnings losses appears less promis-
ing. Given the large long-term costs of layoffs and unemployment, pre-




This chapter is based on a testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of U.S. 
Congress on April 29, 2010, on “Long-Term Unemployment: Causes, Consequences 
and Solutions,” as well as a presentation at the Reconnecting to Work conference at the 
University of California–Los Angeles.
 1. Davis and von Wachter (2012) contrast the effects of job loss in booms and reces-
sions. Farber (2005) provides estimates of the short-term costs of job loss for the 
United States over the past two decades. Couch and Placzek (2010), Kodrzycki 
(2007), Schoeni and Dardia (2003), and von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth 
(2008) show medium-run estimates for California, Connecticut, and Massachu-
setts in the early 1990s.
 2. Estimates of the cost of job loss are robust to extensive controls for worker and 
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fi rm characteristics; the effect of layoffs is not larger when fi rms displace fewer 
workers, such as during smaller layoffs or good economic times.
 3. For a more technical overview, see Meyer (2002).
 4.  This point is made by Chetty (2008), who estimates that over half of employment 
effects of UI may be due to such an income effect.
 5. The take-up rate of UI fl uctuates between 40 and 50 percent for all unemployed 
and between 70 and 80 percent among job losers (Congressional Budget Offi ce 
2004). A similar back of the envelope calculation and caveat is made by Elsby, 
Hobijn, and Şahin (2010, Section 3.2).
 6. Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) discuss the role of aggregate factors in deter-
mining the employment effects of UI extensions; Rothstein (2011) provides esti-
mates suggesting small to moderate employment effects of UI extensions in the 
United States during the Great Recession of 2008.
 7. For example, for an assessment of the effect of wage subsidies, see Perloff and 
Wachter (1979) and Congressional Budget Offi ce (2010). For an assessment of the 
effect of training programs for displaced workers see U.S. Department of Labor 
(1995, Section 5). For a meta-analysis of the effect of various labor market poli-
cies, see Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010).
 8. While the average returns from training are positive, relatively few displaced 
workers take up training (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 2005).
 9. U.S. Department of Labor (1995, Section 5). For a survey of recent evidence see 
Jacobson (2009).
 10. This has been recently advocated under the name of wage insurance, for example, 
by Kling (2006); Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993); and Litan and Kletzer 
(2001). Evidence on related reemployment bonus experiments suggests that short-
term subsidies raise employment, but may only be cost-effective if targeted to 
workers most likely to exhaust their benefi ts (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 
2005; U.S. Department of Labor 1995).
 11. This argument is spelled out in Hassett’s (2010) testimony to the House Commit-
tee on Financial Services.
 12. Burda and Hunt (2011) and Möller (2010) assess the role of work sharing and 
work-time accounts in averting layoffs in Germany.
 13. A small theoretical literature discusses why such contracts are not prevalent in the 
United States (Grossman and Hart 1983; Ramey and Watson 1997).
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